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Abstract 
Workplace-based training has been praised for its effectiveness in smoothing the school to work 
transition. Apprentices have been shown to have lower initial unemployment probabilities as 
compared to other secondary-school graduates. There are but a handful of studies that can 
convincingly show that the effect of apprenticeship training on labor market outcomes is causal. This 
study provides additional support for the argument that workplace-based practical training increases 
initial employment probabilities. Using a unique individual panel database which includes, among 
others, extensive controls for individual skills, school attainment and parental background, it is shown 
that Hungarian students in the lowest, non-college bound vocational training track have about a 10-
15% higher probability of employment after leaving school, as opposed to graduates of the same track, 
who carried out their practical training within the school. This effect seems to be stable across 
industries. The data also shows that apprentices, when employed, earn the same amount of money, but 
are more likely to receive long-term contracts compared to non-apprentices. Moreover, apprentices 
who move to another industry, are less likely to receive long-term contracts compared to “stayers”, but 
are more likely to receive long term contracts compared to non-apprentices. These results suggests that 
it is not the increased specific skills of apprentices, but rather the increased screening and maybe the 
signaling effect of apprenticeship training that smoothes the school to work transition. 
Keywords 
School to work transition, apprenticeship training, causal inference, unemployment, vocational 
training. 
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Introduction 
Workplace-based training has long been praised for its effectiveness in preparing non-college bound 
youth for the labor market. In particular the “dual” vocational education and training (VET) systems at 
the secondary level, combining school-based vocational education with employer-provided, 
workplace-based (apprentice) training, have sustained a positive track record in smoothing the school 
to work transition process, lowering the unemployment rate, and increasing the quality of work 
(Rosenbaum et al. 1990; Müller and Shavit 1998; Shavit and Müller 2000; Ryan 2001; Breen 2005; 
Wolbers 2007; Wolter and Ryan 2011; Noelke and Horn 2011; Piopiunik and Ryan 2012). 
Nevertheless, existing empirical research provides little information about the causal mechanisms that 
make the mixed school and workplace-based education effective. In particular, the mechanisms that 
explain why apprentices find their first job more quickly than non-apprentices are empirically not well 
tested. 
This paper improves on existing literature in two ways. It adds empirical support to the 
positive causal link between workplace-based training and early labor market outcomes, and provides 
tests on the potential reasons why apprenticeship training leads to smoother school to work transition. 
Note that this study looks at the supply side of the market, rather than the demand side. The question is 
thus not why firms provide apprenticeship training, but whether apprentices are better off, and if yes, 
why?  
 
Causal relation 
There are at least four problems in the way of determining the causal effects of apprenticeship training 
on the individual level labor market outcomes (see Wolter and Ryan 2011). 1) It is hard to implement 
the counterfactual. What are the foregone choices for students entering apprenticeship training? Which 
group of students/workers would be the “control group”? While this question is inherently an 
empirical one, many previous studies were able to consider only the differences between the various 
school tracks (e.g. Breen 2005; Wolbers 2007; Rosenbaum et al. 1990; Müller and Shavit 1998; Shavit 
and Müller 2000). This comparison, however, is problematic, since 2) the allocation of young people 
to upper-secondary programs is not random (see e.g. Bertschy, Cattaneo, and Wolter 2009), which 
increases the probability of omitted variable bias, and thus makes estimations unreliable. The problem 
is not only that students are selected or self-selected into the different programs (tracks), but also that 
curricular or quality differences between school programs make it hard to establish whether the 
different types of schools or the differences in school-based vs. workplace-based training drives the 
results. Moreover, 3) the effects of apprenticeship training could differ between occupations. Some 
occupations might be learnt in school, while practical skills – acquired in firms – might be essential in 
another. Also, since the distribution of training provision varies between occupations, the lack of such 
information can easily bias the results. And finally 4) it could be argued that the usual outcome of 
unemployment or income does not cover all possible fields where apprenticeship might benefit or 
harm the students. 
 
Research questions 
The first aim of this paper is to eliminate most of the above concerns when testing the effects of 
workplace-based training on labor market entrance by using a new panel database, the Hungarian Life 
Course Survey (HLCS). The study compares two groups of students within one secondary level 
program. It is possible to look at the vocational training track, and compare those who have taken 
workplace-based training (apprentices) with those who were enrolled only in school-based training. 
Because of the institutional set-up of the Hungarian VET system (see below) non-college bound 
students, who enter the “lowest” vocational training track, could either carry out their compulsory 
practical training at firms or within the school. Hence the “treatment” and the “control” groups within 
the system are quite obvious: both groups have received the same general training (the first two years 
in the vocational training program) and they might even go to the same school; the only difference is 
the place where practical training takes place. Although the allocation of students between training 
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places might not be random, the HLCS offers an exceptionally wide variety of controls, which reduces 
the omitted variable bias concern. Moreover, the HLCS is a panel database, which rules out the 
problem of inverse causality. The database also includes information on the types of qualification that 
students have acquired, which allows for an industry (proxy for occupation) control at the individual 
level. Finally the database is rich enough to test the effect of apprenticeship training on several labor 
market outcomes including, besides the usual unemployment probability, the net earning, the length of 
contract, and post-secondary training. 
Hungary is also a good country in which to study the effects of apprenticeship training. The 
Hungarian VET is not a dual-system per se. In fact, the system is very much school-based, with 
relatively few links to the labor market (Kis et al. 2008). The system has been one of the most 
decentralized ones in the OECD (OECD 2004). So, if having practice at a private firm is indeed 
beneficial, Hungarian apprentices can really profit from this experience. Also, the outcomes of the 
Hungarian VET system are around the OECD average. The youth unemployment relative to adults 
ratio, the “neither employed nor in education or training”  ratio, and the share of upper-secondary 
vocational students are all around the middle (Piopiunik and Ryan 2012), which suggests that 
Hungarian VET is most likely not an outlier and that the conclusions might also be generalizable to 
other VET systems. 
The second aim of the paper is to provide some empirical results on the potential reasons for 
the decreased unemployment of apprentices. Why do students benefit from apprenticeship training? 
To put it simply, there are three main lines of argument (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998; Plug and Groot 
1998; Wolter and Ryan 2011). The first is a human capital argument: apprentices find their initial job 
more quickly because of their improved skills, which facilitates faster adoption to the new workplace, 
as well as higher productivity right from the start. Skills learnt at the workplace can either be specific 
to the firm, or technologically general (cf. Acemoglu and Pischke 1998), meaning that although skills 
acquired at the firm are specific to the given technology, they can also be useful in other firms using 
the same technology. The second is a screening argument: graduates with workplace-based training 
are already screened by employers and, thus, the risk of hiring someone with unfavorable 
characteristics is smaller than for graduates with school-based training. Or similarly, training firms 
select their future employees already when they hire apprentices; that is, they equate this period of 
VET training with the usual probation period. And the third is a signaling argument: apprentices carry 
a signal that informs the future employer about their unobservable characteristics, even if the firm is 
not their training firm.  
While all these arguments predict a lower initial level of unemployment for apprentices, there 
are differences in the prediction of other outcomes. The human capital argument predicts higher wages 
for the increased productivity of apprentices, while the pure screening or signaling argument does not. 
If we believe that apprenticeship training increases the specific or technologically general skills of the 
trainees, then firms should reward this by increasing their wages. Note that this is a simplified 
argument, since firms might consider the training to be an allowance for the apprentice, and thus cut 
their starting salary accordingly, which decreases the wage differences between employed apprentices 
and non-apprentices. 
Both the screening and the signaling argument put forward a higher ratio of long-term 
contracts for apprentices, but the human capital argument does not. If firms use apprenticeship training 
as the probation period, they are more likely to offer apprentices long-term contracts after they hire 
them, since they have already done the screening. Similarly, if apprenticeship training carries an 
important signal, firms are more likely to offer long-term contracts to apprentices, since the risk 
involved in their employment is smaller. 
To separate the effect of signaling and screening I separate those who stayed at the same firm, 
where they were trained, and those who moved to a different firm after the training period was over. 
The signaling argument would predict “stayers” should receive long-term contracts just as likely as the 
“movers”, since both groups carry the same signal, but both groups should be in a better position than 
non-apprentices. However the screening argument would put forward that only “stayers” benefit from 
training, while “movers” are in the same position as non-apprentices. 
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Note that there are limitations to apprenticeship training (see Ryan 2011). The benefits of 
apprenticeship might differ not only across occupations but also across students. Some might prefer 
the theoretical approach, while others the practical, and we know little about the distribution of these 
groups. Also, employers might utilize apprentices as “cheap labor”, i.e. consider them as a source and 
not as an investment (Ryan 2011; Mohrenweiser and Zwick 2009; Wolter and Ryan 2011), which 
suggests that apprentices might not profit from workplace-based training in terms of human capital. 
Moreover, it is very hard to strike the right balance between academic and practical training, or 
between general and specific skills. The over-abundance of either – in the case of VET – might be 
considered harmful either in the short run (no specific skills), or in the long run (no general skills). In 
relation to this, the immediate benefits of apprenticeship training – such as the smoother school to 
work transition – might be counterbalanced by long run disadvantages (Plug and Groot 1998; Ryan 
2001). Hence, it is not at all obvious that apprenticeship is indeed beneficial for all, even in the short 
run. 
 
Previous research 
There are but a handful of empirical studies that offer analysis of the causal effects of apprenticeship 
training on individual level labor market outcomes (see Wolter and Ryan 2011). These analyses 
almost exclusively predict that apprentices benefit from workplace-based training, in that their initial 
employment probability is higher, but their methods, additional tests, and conclusions differ. 
Bonnal et al. (2002) show for France that apprentices have a better chance of finding a job 
immediately after graduation, but this effect is mainly driven by the “stayers”, i.e. those that stay at the 
firm that provided the training. Female apprentice “movers” have the same (or lower) employment 
probability than non-apprentice vocational students, while male “movers” also have lower 
employment probability than “stayers”, but similar or higher than non-apprentices. The authors argue 
that this finding could be due to three distinct reasons, among which they are unable to discriminate: a) 
apprentices might lack the general human capital, as opposed to non-apprentice VET students, and 
thus finding a job at a new firm is harder/not-easier; b) “movers” might be negatively selected, as 
those who are not hired by the training firm might have some unobserved negative trait; and similarly 
c) there might be a negative signaling effect associated with moving to another firm, even if  “movers” 
are not different from “stayers” in other respects. Nevertheless, all these considerations point more 
towards the screening and the signaling model than the human capital model. 
Other studies that look at the causal link worry less about the reasons for increased 
employment opportunity. Bertschy, Cattaneo and Wolter (2009) also find that full-time vocational 
students are less likely to finish education successfully, as opposed to apprentices, and hence less 
likely to find an adequate job 1 ¾ years after the modal student finished education. But their focus is 
on another important point involved in this topic. Looking at the Swiss training system, they 
emphasize that self-selection into educational tracks is very important. In fact, students with higher 
PISA literacy scores are less likely to drop out, and less likely to enroll in a vocational field with a 
higher intellectual level; but the level of literacy does not have a direct effect on the probability of 
finding an adequate job, yet only though the vocational track choice.   
Noelke and Horn (2011) study Hungary after the transition, when the number of 
apprenticeship training places has dropped significantly. Using the fact that the decrease in training 
places was different in the different counties, they conclude that apprentices are less likely to be 
unemployed after they enter the labor market; this effect fades out some time after entry into the labor 
market. The authors find no differences in the quality of job acquired in the labor market. Parey (2009) 
also uses variation in the supply of apprenticeship places in local labor markets as an exogenous 
predictor for individuals’ choice between firm-based apprenticeship training and fully school-based 
vocational program, to identify the returns to apprenticeship training. Similarly to the above listed 
papers, he shows that apprenticeship training leads to substantially lower unemployment rates, which 
fade out over time. 
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The HLCS data 
The Hungarian Life Course Survey (HLCS) is an individual panel survey conducted annually. The 
original sample of 10,022 respondents was chosen in 2006 from the population of 108,932 eighth 
grade students with valid test scores from the National Assessment of Basic Competencies (NABC). 
The NABC measures the literacy and numeracy of all 6th, 8th and 10th grade students in every year, 
starting from 2006 (OECD 2010). The NABC also contains a set of family background variables, such 
as parental education or employment status. The first HLCS survey wave was completed during the 
winter of the school-year 2006/7, and subsequent waves have been fielded on a yearly basis. Currently 
there are 6 waves available with fairly large response rates. The sample appreciation, on average, is 
around 5% (see Table 1). 
The HLCS database contains detailed information on skills (literacy and numeracy in 8th grade 
as well as class marks in each year), ethnicity, school trajectory, family background –including 
parental education and income –, and many other dimensions. The main blocks are family and 
financial situation, parents’ work history, studies/school results, track change/dropout, labor market, 
and data on partner/child. Although students with special educational needs (SEN) are overrepresented 
in the data, propensity weights are used to control for the oversampling, and the imminent sample 
attrition, in the estimations. The HLCS database also has a fully representative subsample (7,218 of 
the 10,022 students in 2006/07). This subsample is used for robustness checks, and for analyses where 
weights could not be utilized. 
To adjust for sample attrition, propensity weights, which were designed to adjust for non-
response and for the oversampling of low-status students in the initial sample, were recalculated for 
each wave. The same stratifying procedures were used as in the initial sample. The three strata are: 1) 
3 settlement types: the capital and big cities, other cities, villages 2) 7 NUTS-2 regions1 3) Reading 
literacy test scores (30 equal groups from the NABC 2006 reading literacy distribution). 
The most important variables of interest in this paper are the school track, the apprenticeship 
status, and the labor market outcome. School track is defined as the student’s school track in the fourth 
wave of the study (see “Hungarian VET system” below), the year when the median student was 
finishing the last year of compulsory schooling. Vocational students could either do their practical 
training within school in class, or in a school workshop, or could go to a private firm, either with the 
help of the school (usually in groups), or by organizing the training by themselves. I have labeled the 
former two as school-based and the latter two as workplace-based training. Anyone, who did 
workplace-based training in the 4th wave or in the 5th wave of the study, is considered an apprentice. 
The four types of labor market outcomes – employed, unemployed, studying and other – are 
considered in the last (available) wave of the study, and are self-declared. The main reason for this is 
that the vast majority of students in the 5th wave (2010/11) were still in school, even among the 
vocational training students (see Table 2). By the school year 2011/12 the majority of vocational 
training graduates have entered the labor market (as employed or unemployed) and only a little less 
than a quarter of them are still in school (e.g. in further training). Besides labor market outcomes, net 
income and the length of employment contract are also used as outcome measures. 
Other variables that are used are the standardized test score (literacy and numeracy), class 
mark averages (1- fail to 5- excellent), gender (0 male, 1 female), SEN status, Roma ethnicity, and 
parental education, and are all from the first wave of the study. Additional controls are the class mark 
average from the 4th wave, whether the student was in the 12th grade in the fourth wave (a proxy for 
repeating class) and whether s/he applied to her/his 9th grade school in the first place (proxy for 
motivation) (see Table 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
1 The NUTS classification (Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics) is a hierarchical system for dividing up the 
economic territory of the EU. 
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The Hungarian VET system  
The Hungarian education system resembles that of the post-Soviet systems (see figure A1 in the 
appendix). Most students choose between three tracks at the end of their 8th grade2: an academic track 
(gimnázium), and two vocational tracks. The vocational secondary track (szakközépiskola) mixes 
academic and vocational training and allows for tertiary entrance after graduation, while the vocational 
training track (szakiskola) is a “dead-end”, but either school-based or workplace-based vocational 
practical training is compulsory. Table 4 shows the transition between 8th grade and 9th grade for the 
cohort included in the HLCS data. Little more than 35% of the cohort enters academic secondary 
tracks, with around 8% already in the early-selective academic tracks. The other two-thirds of students 
go to vocational tracks. A large majority of vocational students (over 40% of the cohort) enter the 
vocational secondary, while around 20% find themselves in vocational training tracks. The remaining 
less than 5% of students are either dropouts, repeaters, or students with special educational needs 
(SEN) enrolled in special vocational training tracks.  
The vocational training (VT) tracks are considered to be the lowest ranked in the hierarchy of 
tracks. Hermann (2013) has shown that vocational training tracks are also of worse quality: students 
suffer substantial losses in literacy and numeracy between grades 8 and 10 as opposed to students in 
the other two tracks. So comparing VT apprentices with non-VT students would bring up several 
methodological problems. Nevertheless the question remains: can workplace-based training improve 
the labor market prospects of non-college bound VT students? 
 
Selection into apprenticeship 
Before addressing the effectiveness of the apprenticeship training it is essential to understand the 
selection into apprenticeship. The system of education, including the vocational schools, is highly 
decentralized in Hungary. All schools that offer training have to state the profession for which they are 
training, based on which students can choose schools. Most professions are included in the National 
Training Register (Országos Képzési Jegyzék - OKJ). The practical training of students in vocational 
training schools cannot start earlier than grade 10, or the age of 16. There is no centralized process for 
the allocation of students to training places. It is the duty of the school to provide a training place for 
each student, although the student can search for a training place for her/himself at any business entity 
(firm). There is only anecdotal evidence about the process of apprenticeship selection, and thus 
endogeneity cannot be ruled out: students, who would more likely be employed, are also more likely 
to get an apprenticeship position. It is not unlikely that apprentices have different personal traits than 
non-apprentices, but it is also highly likely that the local labor market (the demand side), as well as the 
occupation of the trainee (the supply side), has an effect on the probability of employment. 
Table 6 shows the association of the observable personal traits on the difference between 
apprentices and non-apprentices. The most unique controls are the standardized test scores, which are 
measured before students enter the secondary tracks. Note that these test scores cannot be used for the 
secondary level entrance.3 In addition, the 8th grade class marks – which are given by the teachers, and 
which are used for secondary entrance – and the 12th grade class marks are used. Parental background 
effects are proxied by parental education. Roma ethnicity, and SEN status, as well as grade repetition, 
are controlled for. Motivation is measured by the variable of “9th grade track is first choice”, assuming 
that those who were accepted on the track of their first choice are more motivated. The month when 
the survey was taken is also controlled for in all estimations and is not shown. 
The only covariates that are significant in the first estimation (Table 6 column 1) are the 
reading test score and the proxy for grade repetition. Both suggest that higher skilled students are more 
likely to enter into apprenticeships. Within industry estimations (column 2) do not show the skill 
differences between apprentices and non-apprentices, suggesting that there are some occupations that 
attract better students. The most restricted, within school estimations (column 3), show that people 
with lowly educated parents are more likely to have practical training at private firms. The results also 
                                                     
2 About 8% of each cohort enters the so called early-selective academic tracks after 4th or after 6th grade, thus students are 
already enrolled here at the end of their 8th grade. More on this see Horn (2013).  
3 It is used to make schools accountable and to provide feedback for the teachers (see OECD 2010). 
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suggest that students who get higher class marks at the end of the first semester of the last year are also 
more likely to become an apprentice. Whether more motivated students (who do better in class) are 
more likely to become apprentices, or whether teachers give higher grades to those who could get 
outside-school practice, is unknown.  
Both the AIC and the BIC statistics are smaller for the within industry model than the first 
model, but it is the smallest for the within school estimation, suggesting that both the industry and the 
school effects are very important. Also, the adjusted count R2 for the first estimation is only 0.04, 
meaning that the personal traits can only help to predict the outcome in 4% of the cases, suggesting 
that the observed personal traits are not very important in selection into apprenticeship. 
So it seems that while on the national level there are very small but observable differences 
between the average personal traits of apprentices and non-apprentices, these observable differences 
seem to diminish within school and within occupation. 
 
Does workplace-based training increase labor market outcomes? 
The base model is a multinomial logit model with all four possible outcomes – employed, 
unemployed, studying, and other – on the left hand side. Due to the fact that the right hand side 
variables are measures before the left hand side variable, reverse causality is unlikely. In order to 
minimize omitted variable bias all controls presented in Table 3 are included group-by-group in Table 
7. In the first estimation (1) only apprentice is included, in the second (2) measures of skills (test 
scores and class marks) are also controlled for, while in the third (3) the social background 
characteristics and other controls are included. Note that apprenticeship training is significant in all 
three estimations, and show, that those VT students who had carried out practical training at a private 
firm, as opposed to doing practical training in school, have around 1.5 times higher odds of being 
employed, as opposed to being unemployed. This effect is unchanged by any of the personal traits that 
are included in the model. On the other hand skills, as well as social background, matter. It seems that 
class marks matter more than skills, measured by standardized test scores 6 years earlier, in the 
probability of being employed. Parental education also plays a role, but only if the parents have a low 
educational background. There are important gender differences, and those who did not repeat a class 
up to grade 12 are also more likely to get a job. 
The baseline uncontrolled average probability of being employed for a VT student in 2011 is 
44%. Apprentices, however have a 47% chance, while school-based trained students have a 39,5% 
chance of being employed. The chances of being unemployed is the reverse: apprentices have a 21% 
chance, while the others have a 26,5% chance. There are no differences in the uncontrolled average 
baseline probabilities of the other two outcomes between the two groups (study: 24%, other: 9%). 
Using the above model (Table 7, full model), to predict the probabilities, yields very similar results. 
The average predicted a probability for apprentices is 47,5%, while for the school-trained it is 38,7%. 
The respective predicted probabilities at means are 48,9% and 39,2%, thus the sample distribution is 
not highly skewed. The marginal effect of being trained at a private firm is 9,6% at the mean. This 
effect is very similar for the top of the range students (high class mark averages, high literacy and 
numeracy, and parents with secondary general or tertiary schooling) as well as for the lowest (low 
class mark averages, low literacy and numeracy, and parents’ education primary or below). While the 
marginal effect for the first type is 8,2%, for the second it is 10,8%, and both are highly statistically 
significant. 
The effectiveness of workplace-based training can depend very much on the type of the 
industry. The HLCS contains information on the type of the OKJ qualification for vocational 
graduates, although the number of missing cases is high (see Table 5). Of the 1,471 VT students only 
964 has this information in the dataset. Table 8 shows the same multinomial logit model with industry 
fixed effects added.4  
The main conclusion does not change even if industry fixed effects are controlled for: 
apprentices have a 1,7 times higher odds to be employed vs. being unemployed in 2011 spring than 
                                                     
4 Note that due to the large missing values of industry codes I recalculated the sample weights with the inverse ratio of 
having a qualification using the original sampling strata, and hence the larger weighted number of observations. 
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those with only school-based vocational training practice. Table 9 shows the predicted probabilities 
and marginal effects of apprenticeship for a student with qualifications in the different industries at the 
population mean and at the industry means. While the probability of being employed differs a lot 
between industries, the effect of workplace-based training remains stable across industries. 
The non-difference of apprentice effect in the different industries is also underlined if 
workplace-based training and industry product term interaction are included in the model. Since 
interaction terms in non-linear models are problematic (Ai and Norton 2003), I have estimated linear 
probability models5 on the probability of being employed (1) vs. unemployed, studying or other (0) 
with industry and apprentice interactions (Table A1 in the Appendix).6 The results show that although 
the effect of apprenticeship training is statistically significant only in mechanics, services, and 
agriculture, the effects do not significantly differ between any two industries, except industry and 
mechanics on the 10% level (Table A2). 
 
Robustness checks 
Although reverse causality is not likely in the base model, school fixed effects estimation below can 
further diminish the problem of omitted variable bias. Other checks will also highlight that the results 
are not driven by the model specification, or by the measured outcome. 
Table 10 adds school fixed effects to the base model as well as to the industry fixed effect 
model. Looking at differences within schools is an especially strong test of the effect of apprenticeship 
training, since it controls for both local labor market effects as well as potential differences between 
school quality. Note that the HLCS has not used schools as sampling units, thus the fact that some 
students are from the same school is chance only. In fact the 1471 VT students are from 295 VT 
schools, providing, on average, about 5 students per school for the test. There are only 16 schools with 
only one student in the sample. Taking missing values as well as the variance of the outcome measure 
within school into account,7 and the fact that the representative subsample should be used due to 
problems of weighting in fixed-effects logistic regressions, little less than 100 schools are left for the 
non-linear analysis. 
Also since the multinomial logit model with a large number of fixed effects has not yet been 
fully developed (see Pforr 2011), I have estimated linear probability models as well as logit models 
with fixed effects for this robustness check. Moreover, since fixed effect logit models in Stata cannot 
deal with within group weights, the representative subsample had to be utilized (Table10). 
Nevertheless, the effect of apprenticeship training remained significant in both non-linear and 
linear specifications without industry fixed effects. Also the size of the effect – both the average 
marginal effect (11-12%) and the odds ratio (1.8) – is very similar to that of the base model. 
Moreover, while the apprentice parameters in the models, where both industry and school fixed effect 
were included, have lost their significance, their size has not changed.8 I believe this is a very strong 
test of the effect of apprenticeship training on employment. 
Tests in Table 12 ensure that the observed effects are not due to the definition of the 
apprentice variable. The same multinomial logit model is used as in the base model but apprenticeship 
training is split into two years: those who were trained in the 4th wave, and those who were trained in 
the 5th wave (Table 11).  
Tables 12 and 13 highlight that apprenticeship training has a strong effect on the probability of 
being employed, even for those who had training after finishing compulsory schooling. Students 
                                                     
5 Note that the critique of Horrace and Oaxca (2006) that linear probability models are inherently biased might be less 
important here, since most of the independent variables are dummies, thus out of sample prediction is less likely (and see 
also Angrist and Pischke 2008). 
6 Estimating the same models on the probability of being employed (=1)  vs. unemployed (=0) offers substantively the same 
results. 
7 Fixed-effect logit regressions identify the effect only from schools, where both apprenticed and non-apprenticed students 
were present. 
8 Note that including the school as well as the industry fixed-effects look at only those schools where there are apprentices as 
well as non-apprentices present, and apprentices do training in multiple industries.  
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enrolled in workplace-based training in the 5th wave of the study (after the median student finished 
compulsory education) have on average an 8% higher chance of being employed in the next year, 
ceteris paribus the effect of workplace-based training in the 4th wave and 5th wave employment status. 
This effect is also constant across industries. 
The third robustness check uses another set of outcome variables. The HLCS also asks 
students about their employment status during the last academic year. That is, students in the 6th wave 
of the study, in 2012 spring, were asked whether they had had any regular job during the months 
between September 2010 (the start of the school year) and August 2011, and students in the 5th wave 
were asked whether they had a regular job between September 2009 and August 2010. The data is for 
each month in between. Figure 1 depicts the predicted probability for a male, non-Roma, non-SEN 
student with average class marks and test scores, parents with vocational education, who has not 
repeated class up until 12th grade, and applied for his track in the first place in 9th grade, and filled out 
the survey in May 2012. The dependent variable is 1, if the student had a regular job, and 0 otherwise. 
It seems that apprentices are much more likely to find a regular job right after the end of the 
school year. The gap between the average employment probability of apprentices and non-apprentices 
grows during the summer months, and does not decline afterwards. This indicates that apprentice VT 
students have a smoother transition into the labor market than the non-apprentice VT students. The 
effect is also quite sizeable. It is around 14% in August 2011 (decreasing to 10% in 2010 May), while 
the average employment probability is around 40%. 
The same pattern is observable within almost all of the industries (figure 2). The employment 
probability gap between apprentices and non-apprentices increase to around 11-20% after the end of 
school, for the three months, and then it either decreases slightly (as in mechanics and transport-
environment), or stays at the same level, but remains statistically significant and large. 
Whether this effect is due to the superior specific skills that apprentices gained while being 
trained at the firm, or due to the increased screening or the increased signaling effect, is not clear from 
these figures. While screening and signaling would predict an immediate and large difference between 
the groups – because training firms hire the best candidates right away – which should fade away by 
time, the human capital argument would suggest a steady but continuous increase in the gap, which 
should only fade away after a good amount of time, when others also gain the specific skills. The 
increase in the first three months supports the human capital argument, but frictions in the labor 
market (e.g. summer break at firms) could also explain why the screening or signaling takes time to 
“kick in”. Also the decline (or non-increase) in the differences after the third month would underline 
the screening and the signaling argument, but proponents of the human capital argument could argue 
that the still remaining 10%+ gap in employment chances could well be the exact reward for superior 
employer skills. 
In order to see whether the signaling or the human capital argument comes closer to reality, 
other outcomes should be studied. 
 
Other measures of labor market success 
The HLCS allows for two other types of labor market outcome measure: net earnings and the type of 
employer contract (long-term vs. fix-term).  The HLCS asks for the average monthly net earnings, and 
the average net wage received from the main job of the respondent. If data for the first question was 
missing I imputed it with data from the second. Data only for 14 of the total of 511 employed VT 
students was missing (2,4% of cases). The uncontrolled mean net earnings for the apprentices were 
almost exactly the same as for the non-apprentices: 85 thousand Hungarian forints (~280 Euro). Table 
14 shows the model where the net earning is regressed on the same controls as in the base model. The 
difference between apprentices and non-apprentices remains insignificant, even after controls are 
included. 
However, as noted above, firms might consider the training to be an allowance for the 
apprentice, and thus cut their starting salary accordingly. This would also decrease the wage 
differences between employed apprentices and non-apprentices, even if apprentices have increased 
skills. Luckily the HLCS have asked about the reservation wage of the students. Using this 
information to impute the net wages of the non-employed – and assuming that students correctly judge 
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their own skills, and hence their reservation wage corresponds to this – I tested the difference between 
apprentices and non-apprentices. Apparently, there seems to be no difference at all. 
Another technique to correct for the selection bias is the Heckman (1979) sample selection 
method.9 Table 13 column 3 and 4 show the Heckman correction for the model in column 1. Although 
the selection corrected results are somewhat larger, neither of the estimates shows significant effects 
of apprenticeship on net earnings. 
The no-difference in net earnings between apprentices and non-apprentices suggests that 
employment differences are not due to increased skills but due to something else. 
Table 15 regresses the dummy of a long-term contract (vs. fix-term-contract) on the controls 
of the base model. Apparently, apprentices are more likely to get long-term contracts, as opposed to 
fix-term contracts, than school-based trained students. While 73% of employed apprentice students 
have long-term contracts in spring 2012, the respective figure for non-apprentices is only 62%. Even 
after controlling for the individual characteristics, as in the base model, the chance of an average 
apprentice getting a long-term contract is significantly higher. The average marginal effect is around 
16% (table 15, columns 1-2). The effects are substantively the same, even if industry fixed effects are 
included (table 15, columns 3-4).10 
These results suggest that the screening or the signaling effect is more important in getting the 
first job than skills. If apprenticeship students had superior skills compared to non-apprentices, firms 
would most likely offer them a higher amount to compensate for higher productivity. On the other 
hand, if screening or signaling did not matter, the chance for non-apprentices to get a fix-term contract 
should be just as high as for apprentices. This latter result suggests that firms use apprenticeship 
training as some sort of a substitute for the probation period, or they use it as a signal about the quality 
of the apprentices. 
To separate these two effects, the “stayers” and the “movers” should be separated. If screening 
is more important that signaling, “stayers”, i.e. those who get their first job at the firm where they were 
apprentices, might drive the results, as in case of France (Bonnal, Mendes, and Sofer 2002), if 
however signaling is more important, there should be no difference between these two groups of 
students. 
 
“Stayers” and “movers” 
Unfortunately the HLCS does not contain direct information about the exact firm of the 
apprenticeship. Nevertheless the type of firm11 during the apprenticeship, as well as the type of first 
job, is surveyed, but only after the 5th wave. That is, the effect of “moving” can only be estimated for 
those who had workplace-based training in the 5th wave. Moreover, since these firm categories are 
very broad, this is a better proxy for “moving” than for “staying”, since it is likely that if the industry 
of the training firm and the employer is not the same, people have moved; however its converse does 
not mean that apprentices have stayed where they were trained.12 Table A3 in the appendix shows the 
number of students within the different apprenticeship/employer type categories. Naturally this 
variable is only available for those who were apprentices in the 5th wave and got a job in the 6th wave. 
                                                     
9 This is a textbook case for the Heckmann selection bias: only the earnings of the employed are observed, and since non-
apprentices are less likely to be employed thus the observed mean earning of the non-apprentices are likely to be higher 
than the unobserved wage offers, the effect of apprenticeship training on observed earnings is likely to be downwardly 
biased. 
10 I have also estimated a Heckman probit correction model, with no significant sign for selection bias. Not shown here. 
11 Agriculture, forestry and fishing; Mining and quarrying; Processing; Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning; Water 
supply, wastewater collection and treatment, waste management; Construction Trade, automotive services; 
Transportation, warehousing; Hotels and restaurants, catering; Information, communication; Financial and insurance 
activities; Real estate transactions; Professional, scientific and technical activities; Administrative and support service 
activities; Administration and defense, compulsory social security; Education; Human health and social work; Arts, 
entertainment and recreation; Other services; Households as employers, producers, and service; Organizations outside 
Hungary; Other.  
12 But if we assume technologically specific skills these categories are useful. 
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Thus employment probabilities cannot be analyzed, only the effects in terms of net earnings and long-
term contracts. The reference group is non-apprentices, with a job in the 6th grade. 
The results seem to underline that screening has an important effect: “stayers” have a 22-23% 
higher chance, or 2.8-3.1 times higher odds, of receiving a long-term contract as opposed to either 
“movers” or to non-apprenticeship students who are employed in the 6th wave. The advantage of 
“movers”, as opposed to non-apprentices, is less obvious. It is non-significant in the linear, but 
significant in the logit specification, and the size of the effect is also much smaller, but still sizeable; 
around 10-15% higher probability or 1.5-2 times higher odds. Nevertheless, movers do have a non-
negative or positive advantage, which suggests that signaling also matters for finding the first job. On 
the other hand, differences in net-earning – again – are not significant, which downplays the 
importance of skills (table 16). 
 
Conclusion 
Although workplace-based training has long been praised for its effectiveness in preparing non-college 
bound youth for the labor market, there are but a handful of studies that could convincingly show that 
the observed association between apprenticeship training and higher initial employment probability is 
causal. This analysis shows that vocational training program graduates, who have done their practical 
training at private firms (apprentices), are around 10-15% more likely to be employed after they finish 
education, than those who had their practical training in schools. This effect is net of individual skills, 
school attainment, parental background, motivation, gender and ethnicity, and robust to the inclusion 
of school fixed effects. The effect is also very similar across industries, and is likely to remain 
significant and large during the first year in the labor market. 
On the other hand, there seems to be no difference between the net earnings of apprenticed 
and non-apprenticed students after they are employed, which suggests that there are no significant 
differences in specific skills between these two groups. However, the difference between the two 
groups in getting a long-term contract with their employer is significant and sizeable. Apprentices are 
16-20% more likely to sign a long-term contract as opposed to the non-apprentices, which suggests 
that firms might use the training period as a probation period (screening), or that an apprenticeship is a 
good signal on the labor market. Comparing those who might have stayed at the same firm where they 
were trained, with those who moved to another type of sector, shows that “stayers” are more likely to 
get long term contracts, but not more likely to earn more money, which suggests that screening plays 
an important role in apprenticeship training. On the other hand “movers” also have a higher 
probability of getting a long term contract as opposed to non-apprentices, which implies that their 
apprenticeship training might also have a signaling function. 
All in all, this study argues that the positive effect of workplace-based training on initial 
employment probability is causal, but it is more likely to be due to the increased screening, and maybe 
due to the increased signals, that it offers for firms, and not due to increased productivity.
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Table 1. Basic statistics of the HLCS database 
wave School year Date of the 
survey 
Median school 
grade 
Number of 
students (with 
oversampling SEN 
students) 
Number of students 
(representative sub-
sample) 
1 2006/07 2006 fall 9 10022 (100%) 7218 (100%) 
2 2007/08 2007 fall 10 9300 (92,8%) 6716 (93%) 
3 2008/09 2008 fall 11 8825 (88,1%) 6397 (88,6%) 
4 2009/10 2009 fall 12 8333 (83,1%) 6071 (84,1%) 
5 2010/11 2011 spring 13 (LM entry, 
post-secondary 
vocational or 
tertiary) 
7662 (76,4%) 5587 (77,4%) 
6 2011/12 2012 spring 14 (LM entry, 
post-secondary 
vocational or 
tertiary) 
6974 (69,5%) 5111 (70,81%) 
 
Table 2: Labor market outcomes in the 5
th
 and 6
th
 wave 
 5th wave 6th wave 
 work unempl. study other Total work unempl. study other Total 
academic 
(8-yr) 
56 54 2525 96 2731 155 48 2429 39 2671 
% 2,05 1,98 92,46 3,52 100 5,8 1,8 90,94 1,46 100 
academic 
(6-yr) 
212 28 4358 121 4719 255 96 4214 151 4716 
% 4,49 0,59 92,35 2,56 100 5,41 2,04 89,36 3,2 100 
academic 
(4-yr) 
838 775 23360 837 25810 2795 1331 20538 1278 25942 
% 3,25 3 90,51 3,24 100 10,77 5,13 79,17 4,93 100 
voc. sec. 1642 1676 30517 909 34744 7220 4975 19633 2568 34396 
% 4,73 4,82 87,83 2,62 100 20,99 14,46 57,08 7,47 100 
voc. tr. 1647 2066 11306 664 15683 6794 3581 3642 1430 15447 
% 10,5 13,17 72,09 4,23 100 43,98 23,18 23,58 9,26 100 
spec. 
voc. tr. 
191 369 2441 130 3131 736 517 1558 281 3092 
% 6,1 11,79 77,96 4,15 100 23,8 16,72 50,39 9,09 100 
Missing 2797 4462 12127 2804 22190 6716 4807 7623 3173 22319 
% 12,6 20,11 54,65 12,64 100 30,09 21,54 34,15 14,22 100 
Total 7383 9430 86634 5561 109008 24671 15355 59637 8920 108583 
% 6,77 8,65 79,47 5,1 100 22,72 14,14 54,92 8,21 100 
Note: the Table contains the weighted number of students 
 
  
  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics – students in the 6
th
 wave of HLCS 
Full sample 
Variable obs. weighted obs. mean s.d. min. max. 
math test score (std.) 6453 103298 -0.02 1.04 -3.16 3.08 
reading test score (std.) 7002 108583 -0.10 1.03 -3.78 2.87 
8th grade class mark average 6754 104920 3.87 0.73 1 5 
12th grade class mark average 5463 87557 3.70 0.68 2 5 
female 5367 86074 0.49 0.50 0 1 
SE. student 7001 108573 0.06 0.25 0 2 
Roma 7002 108583 0.06 0.24 0 1 
parents' ed.: below primary 6992 108484 0.01 0.10 0 1 
parents' ed.: primary 6992 108484 0.11 0.31 0 1 
parents' ed.: secondary 6992 108484 0.35 0.48 0 1 
parents' ed.: tertiary 6992 108484 0.25 0.43 0 1 
12th grader in 4th wave 5357 86358 0.85 0.35 0 1 
9th grade track is first choice 6369 97572 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Vocational training students only 
Variable obs. weighted obs. mean s.d. min. max. 
math test score (std.) 1087 14180 -0.83 0.68 -2.74 2.10 
reading test score (std.) 1217 15447 -0.92 0.68 -3.78 1.21 
8th grade class mark average 1170 14883 3.18 0.53 1 5 
12th grade class mark average 1217 15447 3.32 0.58 2 5 
female 1194 15143 0.35 0.48 0 1 
SE. student 1216 15437 0.10 0.32 0 2 
Roma 1217 15447 0.09 0.29 0 1 
parents' ed.: below primary 1214 15412 0.02 0.15 0 1 
parents' ed.: primary 1214 15412 0.20 0.40 0 1 
parents' ed.: secondary 1214 15412 0.25 0.43 0 1 
parents' ed.: tertiary 1214 15412 0.05 0.22 0 1 
12th grader in 4th wave 1217 15447 0.78 0.41 0 1 
9th grade track is first choice 1196 15210 0.73 0.44 0 1 
 
  
  
Table 4: Transition from 8
th
 to 9
th
 grade (from 2006 to 2007) 
  primary ac. (8-yr) ac. (6-yr) Missing Total 
       
9
th
 g
ra
d
e 
primary school 454 17 15 33 519  
% 0,42 0,02 0,01 0,03 0,47 
academic (8-yr) 318 2945 45 92 3400 
% 0,29 2,7 0,04 0,08 3,11 
academic (6-yr) 450 72 4884 197 5603 
% 0,41 0,07 4,47 0,18 5,13 
academic (4-yr) 27895 256 264 773 29188 
% 25,53 0,23 0,24 0,71 26,71 
voc. sec. 42546 274 270 1644 44734 
% 38,94 0,25 0,25 1,5 40,94 
voc. tr. 20693 83 22 739 21537 
% 18,94 0,08 0,02 0,68 19,71 
spec. voc. tr. 2103 18 0 143 2264 
% 1,92 0,02 0 0,13 2,07 
Missing 1794 41 60 124 2019 
% 1,64 0,04 0,05 0,11 1,85 
 Total 96253 3706 5560 3745 109264 
 % 88,09 3,39 5,09 3,43 100 
HLCS data, own calculations 
Note: sample weighted to represent the whole 2006, 8
th
 grade cohort 
 
  
  
Table 5.: .umber and percentage of VT students in school-based and workplace-based training by 
industry  
 Unweighted Weighted 
Industry school-
based 
work-
based 
missing Total school-
based 
work-
based 
missing Total 
social services 3 6 0 9 24 81 0 105 
% 33,33 66,67 0 100 22,86 77,14 0 100 
mechanics 108 112 4 224 1210 1341 41 2592 
% 48,21 50 1,79 100 46,68 51,74 1,58 100 
industry 124 106 2 232 1356 1193 10 2559 
% 53,45 45,69 0,86 100 52,99 46,62 0,39 100 
transport-
environment 
13 19 0 32 108 230 0 338 
% 40,63 59,38 0 100 31,95 68,05 0 100 
services 121 267 7 395 1374 3160 88 4622 
% 30,63 67,59 1,77 100 29,73 68,37 1,9 100 
agriculture 43 29 0 72 462 398 0 860 
% 59,72 40,28 0 100 53,72 46,28 0 100 
missing 178 296 33 507 1483 2628 260 4371 
% 35,11 58,38 6,51 100 33,93 60,12 5,95 100 
Total 590 835 46 1471 6017 9031 399 15447 
% 40,11 56,76 3,13 100 38,95 58,46 2,58 100 
 
  
  
Table 6: Selection into apprenticeship 
  (1) (2) (3) 
        
8th grade class mark avg. 1.369 1.228 0.961 
(0.266) (0.311) (0.292) 
12th grade class mark avg. (1st 
semester) 1.023 1.030 1.519* 
(0.164) (0.198) (0.361) 
math test score (std.), 8th grade 0.779 0.854 0.858 
(0.119) (0.156) (0.200) 
reading test score (std.), 8th grade 1.555*** 1.445* 1.045 
(0.240) (0.274) (0.239) 
parents' ed.: primary or below 1.335 1.166 2.093** 
(0.314) (0.351) (0.740) 
parents' ed.: secondary or higher 1.124 1.095 1.311 
(0.241) (0.288) (0.411) 
SEN student 2.307 3.021 1.303e+06 
(1.987) (2.635) (1.335e+09) 
Roma 1.125 0.890 1.748 
(0.352) (0.343) (0.942) 
9th grade track is first choice 1.103 1.315 1.056 
(0.221) (0.335) (0.311) 
12th grader in 2009 1.580** 1.540 0.996 
(0.356) (0.406) (0.325) 
female 1.005 0.534** 0.784 
(0.200) (0.156) (0.247) 
Constant 0.369 
(0.293) 
Industry FE n y n 
School FE n n y 
Observations 575 404 313 
AIC 780.923 512.427 262.265 
BIC 846.238 568.447 314.712 
OR reported, se in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, 
Month of survey is controlled for 
Note: Representative subsample is used, because fixed-effect logistic regressions cannot deal with within group 
weighting. 
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 Table 8: Multinomial logit model with industry fixed effects, odds of being employed, studying or other 
wrt. being unemployed 
  weighted representative subsample 
VARIABLES work study-trainee other work study-trainee other 
              
apprentice 1.775*** 0.985 1.363*** 2.060*** 0.924 1.196 
(0.0823) (0.0482) (0.130) (0.430) (0.202) (0.487) 
social services 0.306*** 0.841 0.167*** 1.78e-07 0.765 4.85e-08 
(0.0674) (0.136) (0.0511) (0.000189) (0.636) (0.000117) 
mechanics 1.583*** 1.359*** 0.813 1.867** 1.110 0.611 
(0.103) (0.0973) (0.164) (0.549) (0.361) (0.494) 
industry 1.266*** 1.157** 1.094 1.558 1.072 0.683 
(0.0799) (0.0796) (0.153) (0.444) (0.332) (0.404) 
transport-
environment 2.882*** 2.156*** 2.75e-07 1.762 2.143 9.56e-07 
(0.496) (0.403) (0.000221) (1.097) (1.393) (0.000967) 
services 
(reference) 
agriculture 1.267** 2.000*** 2.334*** 2.182 4.092*** 2.406 
(0.123) (0.194) (0.340) (1.058) (1.904) (1.691) 
Constant 0.375*** 0.613** 0.426** 1.207 1.278 5.376 
(0.0785) (0.133) (0.177) (1.177) (1.295) (9.385) 
Net number of 
observations 681 681 681 681 681 681 
Weighted 
number of 
observations 15,824 15,824 15,824 803 803 803 
Standard error in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ORs reported, reference category is unemployed. 
Controls not shown: class marks, test scores, parents education, SEN, Roma, female, 9th grade track choice, 12th 
grader in 4th wave 
 
Table 9: Predicted probabilities and marginal effects for the different industries at the mean. 
 Predicted probability Marginal effect Marginal effect 
 school-based training workplace-based 
training 
workplace-based 
training 
workplace-based 
training 
 at population mean at population mean at industry mean 
social services   0,148       0,236       0,092     0,139 
mechanics   0,404       0,546       0,144     0,145 
industry   0,371       0,511       0,142     0,145 
transport-environment   0,480       0,624       0,143     0,146 
services    0,336       0,473       0,139     0,141 
agriculture   0,291       0,420       0,132     0,145 
 
  
 Table 10: Robustness check with school fixed effects 
  employed=1, unemployed, studying or other=0 
VARIABLES linear logit 
          
apprentice 0.123** 0.113 1.876** 1.841 
(0.0577) (0.0789) (0.557) (0.766) 
Constant 0.566*** 0.336 
(0.218) (0.476) 
school FE y y y y 
industry FE n y n y 
Observations 573 405 397 243 
R-squared 0.500 0.568 
Number of schools 215 178 96 67 
+Note that weights varying within category cannot be used for FE panel logit, thus the representative 
subsample is utilized for all models in this Table 
Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls not shown: class marks, test scores, parents education, SEN, Roma, female, 9th grade track choice, 
12th grader in 4th wave, month of survey in 6th wave 
 
Table 11:  .umber of apprentices in the 4
th
 and 5
th
 wave 
  Apprentice 5th wave 
  No Yes missing Total 
ap
p
re
n
ti
ce
 
4
th
 w
av
e No 205 120 252 577 
Yes 62 388 369 819 
missing 13 16 46 75 
Total 280 524 667 1471 
Note that in the subsequent estimation, students with missing apprentice data in the 5
th
 wave were coded as 0 
(not-apprentices), since they are not in school, and hence not asked this question. 
  
 Table 12:  Multinomial logit model with and without industry fixed effects, odds of being employed, 
studying or other wrt. being unemployed 
  (1) (2) 
VARIABLES work study-trainee other work study-trainee other 
              
employed  in 5th wave 2.391*** 0.0394*** 1.054 2.391*** 2.39e-08 7.08e-08 
(0.193) (0.0135) (0.161) (0.364) (1.57e-05) (9.34e-05) 
apprentice in 5th wave 1.881*** 1.784*** 0.921 1.780*** 1.270*** 1.306** 
(0.103) (0.110) (0.0926) (0.0903) (0.0681) (0.137) 
apprentice in 4th wave 1.193*** 0.762*** 1.107 1.369*** 0.776*** 1.079 
(0.0613) (0.0453) (0.0977) (0.0699) (0.0419) (0.113) 
industry FE n n n y y y 
Constant 0.278*** 0.133*** 0.00574*** 0.0648*** 0.594* 0.0880*** 
(0.0584) (0.0319) (0.00213) (0.0196) (0.158) (0.0444) 
Net number of observations 972 972 972 679 679 679 
Weighted number of 
observations 12,708 12,708 12,708 15,771 15,771 15,771 
Standard error in parentheses, ORs reported, weighted regressions 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls not shown: class marks, test scores, parents education, SEN, Roma, female, 9th grade track choice, 
12th grader in 4th wave, month of survey in 6th wave 
 
Table 13:  Marginal effect of apprenticeship on being employed.  
Marginal effect Model 1 (Table 8) Model 2 (Table 8) 
 apprentice in 5
th
 
wave 
apprentice in 4
th
 
wave 
apprentice in 5
th
 
wave 
apprentice in 4
th
 
wave 
Main effect 0,077 0,080   
social services     0,036       0,038     
mechanics     0,090       0,109     
industry     0,088       0,103     
transport-
environment 
    0,090       0,123     
services      0,084       0,094     
agriculture     0,067       0,087     
Note: marginal effect is calculated for a non-employed, non-apprentice, male, non-Roma, non-SEN student with 
average class marks and test scores, parent with vocational education, who has not repeated class till 12
th
 grade 
and applied for his track in the first place in 9
th
 grade. 
  
 Table 14. Other labor market outcomes – net earnings 
Heckman correction 
  net earning   1st stage 
VARIABLES 
w/ reservation 
wage net earning employed 
          
apprentice 1,201 948.2 8,286 0.240** 
(4,447) (3,022) (5,109) (0.0965) 
8th grade class marks 6,799 4,618 7,137 0.0750 
(5,353) (3,736) (5,995) (0.112) 
class mark (grade) average, 1st semester 5,786 5,751** 912.3 -0.0380 
(3,940) (2,470) (4,294) (0.0794) 
math test score (std.) 1,461 1,382 -762.7 -0.00914 
(3,115) (2,801) (3,944) (0.0755) 
reading test score (std.) 3,086 -1,548 -3,675 -0.0979 
(2,856) (2,300) (4,082) (0.0785) 
parents' ed.: primary or below 4,031 -5,310 -3,549 -0.134 
(5,508) (3,795) (7,045) (0.130) 
parents' ed.: secondary or higher 1,365 5,845 159.7 -0.121 
(5,129) (3,665) (5,855) (0.109) 
SEN student -16,775* -5,754 -17,495* -0.0607 
(8,828) (5,355) (10,505) (0.216) 
Roma -15,917** -1,290 -22,221*** -0.229 
(7,784) (4,992) (8,373) (0.151) 
current track is first choice 2,840 3,900 2,535 0.0302 
(4,113) (3,324) (5,253) (0.103) 
12th grader 6,082 2,644 28,669*** 0.492*** 
(5,800) (3,666) (7,497) (0.119) 
female, NABC 2006 -20,504*** -11,739*** -39,102*** -0.562*** 
(4,720) (3,299) (7,618) (0.106) 
6.fho 6,280 5,407 5,754 0.0621 
(4,339) (3,342) (5,749) (0.108) 
7.fho 9,971 3,219 4,769 0.0120 
(6,115) (3,618) (6,432) (0.124) 
8.fho 1,006 1,594 -3,758 -0.152 
(5,848) (6,847) (12,421) (0.228) 
Constant 40,084* 44,574*** -11,576 -0.709 
(23,501) (15,652) (28,613) (0.451) 
athrho 2.435*** 
(0.393) 
lnsigma 10.91*** 
(0.128) 
Observations 414 891 955 955 
R-squared 0.087 0.051     
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  
 Table 15. Other labor market outcomes – long term contract 
  Linear Logit+ Linear Logit+ 
VARIABLES long-term contract++ long-term contract++ 
          
apprentice 0.162*** 2.080*** 0.209*** 2.864*** 
(0.0593) (0.128) (0.0721) (0.241) 
8th grade class mark avg. -0.0734 0.709*** -0.0440 0.794*** 
(0.0636) (0.0466) (0.0831) (0.0658) 
12th grade class mark avg. (1st semester) 0.0192 1.097* 0.0238 1.130* 
(0.0464) (0.0610) (0.0575) (0.0822) 
math test score (std.), 8th grade 0.0533 1.288*** 0.0580 1.316*** 
(0.0479) (0.0694) (0.0533) (0.0909) 
reading test score (std.), 8th grade -0.0311 0.871*** -0.0476 0.793*** 
(0.0457) (0.0455) (0.0517) (0.0531) 
parents' ed.: primary or below 0.00932 1.043 0.0241 1.151 
(0.0749) (0.0858) (0.0915) (0.126) 
parents' ed.: secondary or higher -0.00625 0.965 0.0798 1.542*** 
(0.0627) (0.0676) (0.0686) (0.139) 
SEN student -0.0447 0.827 -0.0812 0.629** 
(0.153) (0.164) (0.177) (0.135) 
Roma -0.260** 0.327*** -0.267* 0.286*** 
(0.104) (0.0369) (0.140) (0.0439) 
9th grade track is first choice 0.0204 1.093 -0.0368 0.808** 
(0.0601) (0.0719) (0.0652) (0.0718) 
12th grader in 2009 0.0372 1.182* 0.0965 1.585*** 
(0.0843) (0.103) (0.0966) (0.177) 
female 0.0184 1.090 0.0104 1.035 
(0.0679) (0.0795) (0.0880) (0.109) 
Industry FE n n y y 
Constant 0.749*** 3.150*** 0.543* 0.458 
(0.255) (0.841) 0.209*** (0.271) 
Net number of observations 428 428 291 291 
Weighted number of observations  5,693  4,011 
R-squared 0.060   0.138   
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
+ ORs reported, population weighted++ Long term contract =1 fix term contract=0,  
 
  
 Table 16. Stayers vs. movers and non-apprenticeship employed. 
  net earning long-term contract 
VARIABLES linear Logit+ 
              
mover 1,589 2,426 0.102 0.150* 1.545*** 2.020*** 
(5,469) (6,220) (0.0759) (0.0846) (0.115) (0.149) 
stayer 7,977 9,352 0.225*** 0.236** 2.889*** 3.110*** 
(6,144) (6,823) (0.0852) (0.0919) (0.278) (0.259) 
Industry FE n y n y n y 
Constant 35,787 46,038* 0.737*** 0.635** 2.919*** 0.562 
(23,933) (23,482) (0.257) (0.318) (0.817) (0.249) 
Net number of observations 425 284 438 292 438 292 
Weighted number of observations 5,828 6,734 
R-squared 0.100 0.093 0.054 0.132     
Robust Standard errors in parentheses, +ORs reported, weighted regressions 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls not shown: class marks, test scores, parents education, SEN, Roma, female, 9th grade track choice, 
12th grader in 4th wave, month of survey in 6th wave 
 
  
Figure 1. Predicted probability of VT students having a regular job 
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Table A1: Linear probability model with industry and apprenticeship interactions, AME of being 
employed vs. being unemployed, studying or other (weighted) 
  (1) 
VARIABLES employed=1 
Interactions 
Social services * apprentice=0 -0.0527 
(0.374) 
Social services * apprentice=1 -0.123 
(0.116) 
Mechanics * apprentice=0 -0.0801 
(0.0931) 
Mechanics * apprentice=1 0.138 
(0.0904) 
industry * apprentice=0 ref. 
industry * apprentice=1 -0.00618 
(0.0938) 
transport-environment * apprentice=0 0.153 
(0.232) 
transport-environment * apprentice=1 0.142 
(0.179) 
services * apprentice=0 -0.0965 
(0.0954) 
services * apprentice=1 0.0322 
(0.0776) 
agriculture * apprentice=0 -0.220* 
(0.114) 
agriculture * apprentice=1 0.0675 
(0.137) 
Constant 0.286 
(0.211) 
Observations 681 
R-squared 0.109 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Controls not shown: class marks, test scores, parents education, SEN, Roma, female, 9th grade track choice, 12th 
grader in 4th wave, month of survey 
 
Table A2: Does the effect of apprenticeship training differ between industries? 
Significance (p-values) of F-tests, comparing the effects of apprenticeships between industries as 
estimated in table A1.  Diagonal elements show the p-value of apprenticeship training within 
industries. 
 social 
services 
mechanics industry transport-
environment 
services  agriculture 
social services        0,85    
mechanics        0,46           0,02     
industry        0,87           0,09            0,95    
transport-
environment        0,90           0,43            0,99           0,97     
services         0,61           0,45            0,27           0,63            0,09    
agriculture        0,38           0,69            0,10           0,34            0,35           0,06     
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Appendix B 
The official list of OKJ qualifications contains 21 larger categories. I have grouped these into 6 broad 
categories (industries) in order to increase the number of cases within each category, but still facilitate 
relevant comparison between the groups. 
ew categories (industries) Original categories in the national training register 
Social Services Health 
Social services 
Education 
Art, culture, communication 
Mechanics Engineering 
Electrical-engineering, electronics 
Informatics 
Industry Chemical industry 
Architecture 
Light industry 
Wood industry 
Printing industry 
Transportation-environment Transportation 
Environment and water-management 
Services Business and economics 
Management 
Trade, marketing and administration 
Catering, tourism 
Other Services 
Agriculture Agriculture 
Food industry 
 
 
